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The debate between the two leading representatives of  critical theory and Catholic
theology on the moral and (presumably) religious foundations of the secular state
that  can  neither  be  vindicated  nor  ignored  by  secular  reason  has  drawn  great
attention  far  across  the  borders  that  tend  to  separate  theologians  from  liberal
philosophers. The paper seeks to explore the historical context of the debate and to
identify  major areas of agreement between the two discussants before it  examines
some of the more important remaining differences. With the subsequent election of
Cardinal Ratzinger as Pope and the programmatic implications of his Papal name
the debate has taken on a new significance by highlighting the continuous need for
dialogue and deeper understanding between the Church and all people of good will
regardless of intellectual background or ideological affiliations. 
I. Cross-Border Explorations
On Monday, 19 January 2004, the Catholic Academy in Munich hosted a debate between two
of the most distinguished German intellectuals with international acclaim far beyond their
respective  disciplines.  The  debate  took  place  between  Joseph  Cardinal  Ratzinger  and
Professor Emeritus Jürgen Habermas. 
In many quarters the encounter at first stirred up disbelief and utter surprise. It was
thought nearly impossible that two personalities representing positions diametrically opposed
to each other would engage in an open-ended debate and could even find a common language
for it. For many in Germany, Ratzinger as one of the most powerful prelates of the Roman
Church and for over two decades the prefect of the Congregation of Faith, was above all a
conservative theologian whose doctrinal  views would jeopardize any meaningful dialogue
and at best present another dogmatic statement of the Roman point of view. Habermas’ left-
wing friends and followers were taken aback by his willingness to engage in a dialogue with
the head of the congregation that directly succeeded the infamous Sacred Congregation of the
Universal Inquisition established in 1542 by Pope Paul III. to fight heretics and to suppress
free thought. 
It is therefore one of the  great  surprises of this in many ways remarkable encounter
that it not only took place at all, but also that friend and foe acknowledged the great sincerity
and respect with which the two antagonists debated their issue at the highest intellectual level.
And even more significant was that they succeeded in bringing religion and its contribution to
modernity  again  into  focus  of  a  debate  whose  tremendous  implications  far  exceed
Catholicism  and  Christianity  and  extend  to  non-believers  and  unbelievers  alike.  Both
discussants,  albeit  from different angles, found commonalities  in their  claim of a role for
religion within modern society that let forget, at least for a moment, the remaining differences
between them. 
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Apparently, the initiative for the debate came from Cardinal Ratzinger. As a well-
informed observer  not only of developments in contemporary theology but also in the whole
range of the humanities, he seemed to have followed with great interest what in the meantime
has been called Habermas’ approximation  to  religion.  In particular,  Habermas’ surprising
intervention in the debate about the implications of biotechnology, particularly in the context
of  human  cloning  and  wasteful  embryo  research,  had  caught  the  cardinal’s  interest.
Habermas’ small but influential book on the challenge of biological engineering and human
cloning was published in 2001 entitled Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur; the title of the
English translation (2002) aptly indicates its major concern:  The Future of Human Nature.
The book offers an eloquent defense of the right to a unique human identity and explores the
limits of human interference with nature. While Habermas examines the issue from his own
philosophical  perspective,  in  various  points  his  results  show a remarkable  affinity to  the
Catholic position.
Beyond its immediate point of departure, the Munich debate gains its full significance
only  if  it  is  placed  within  the  broader  context  of  a  renewed  interest  among  European
intellectuals in religion and of their search for partners in a dialogue that meets at the high
level  of  intellectual  integrity and sincerity the topic  deserves.  Three specific  contexts  are
worth mentioning. 
1. The Martini-Eco Debate 
The opening issue of the Italian journal Liberal published on 22 March 1995 included the
first of a series of letters between the archbishop of Milan, Carlo Maria Cardinal Martini, and
the world-famous  linguist  and novelist  Umberto  Eco (The Name of  the Rose,  Foucault’s
Pendulum).  Altogether  eight  public  letters  were  exchanged  and  published  in  quarterly
intervals  that  ended in  March 1996.  The letters  met  with  unusual  interest  among Italian
intellectuals,  which  prompted  the  editors  to  invite  others  to  participate  and to  contribute
views from their respective professional backgrounds, i. e. from philosophy, journalism, and
politics. The title under which the letters were collected and published in 1996 once again
indicates  the  overall  topic  of  the  debate:  In  cosa  crede chi  non crede? Which  could  be
literally translated as:  In what does he/she believe who does not believe?1 A German issue
appeared in 1999 and was most appropriately prefaced by the former archbishop of Vienna,
Franz Cardinal König, who from 1965 to 1980 headed the Vatican Secretariat for the Non-
Believers. The title of his preface  succinctly illustrates the significance he attached to this
exchange and to the renewed interest in religion:  The question of God knocks again at our
doors. 
Although it is here not possible to provide an adequate overview of the various issues
the two partners in the dialogue discussed,  the last  two letters touch on an issue that is
directly relevant to the Ratzinger-Habermas debate as well;  it  is  certainly of fundamental
importance to believers and non-believers. While in the first three letters Umberto Eco takes
the  initiative  and  raises  issues  that  range from the  meaning  and  purpose  of  history,  the
beginning of human life and its protection, all the way to the role of women in the Church, in
the last exchange it is the Cardinal who puts the question to Eco. This question relates to the
foundation and authority of ethics  in  the age of post-modern secularization  and is  put  as
follows:  “What is the basis of the certainty and necessity for moral action of those who, in
order to establish the absolute nature of an ethic, do not intend to appeal to metaphysical
principles or transcendental values, or even to universally valid categorical imperatives?” He
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reformulates it again and asks more specifically: “Which reasons can someone adduce for his
actions whose moral principles entail the possible sacrifice of his own life but who does not
believe in  a  personal  God?”2 Martini  emphasizes  that  his  goal  is  not  to  “upset  anyone’s
conscience,” but to bring believers and nonbelievers closer in their cooperation towards a
more humane world. As one critic remarked, Martini frames his words without any sense of
judgment or superiority, and it is very obvious that he has a genuine desire to understand
secular humanism at its root level. He also expresses his hope that a common ground can be
found on which the principle of human dignity could be based that would inspire, motivate,
and morally guide the  actions  of  people that  may otherwise  be separated  by secular  and
religious divisions.3
Eco’s response consists  partly in exploring what he calls  “semantic  universals” or
“elementary notions that are common to the entire human species and can be expressed in all
languages.” From there he develops some kind of evolutionary ethics that has its foundational
experience in the encounter with “the other.” He maintains that “the ethical dimension begins
when the  other  appears  on the scene” and when it  dawns on the individual  that  nobody
“should do to others what he does not wish to be done to him.” 
In our present context even more significant is Eco’s description of what he calls his
“lay religiosity,” as this offers a pre-religious yet foundational perspective on life that could
be  shared  by secular  and  religious  communities:  “I  firmly  hold  that  there  are  forms  of
religiosity, and therefore a sense of the Holy, of the Limit, of questioning and of awaiting, of
communion with something that transcends us, even in the absence of faith in a personal and
provident divinity.” 
Such a position is not that of an atheist, which - for Eco - is simply the exchange of one form
a belief with another (cf. the book’s Italian title). Or as he puts it: “I do not see how one can
not believe in God, and hold that His existence cannot be proved, and then firmly believe in
the nonexistence of God, holding that it can be proved.” 
Instead,  he  regards  himself  more  as  an  agnostic  -  and  this  is  another  parallel  to
Habermas. In allusion to Max Weber’s famous self-characterization, Habermas too has called
himself  “religiously tone-deaf.” There is even a further similarity that is worth mentioning.
The Martini-Eco exchange is not only respectful and filled with curiosity and even warmth,
both authors are also “perfectly matched thinkers, gentlemen scholars with a genuine interest
in what the other has to say” (Allan B. Ruch). I think the same can be said about the exchange
between Habermas and Ratzinger. And a final observation applies to the Habermas-Ratzinger
debate: As Harvey Cox in his introduction to the English translation of the letters between
Eco and Martini remarked, “reading this book left me wanting more.” 
2. More Lines of Communication
And  more  was  forthcoming  when  in  2002  the  well-known  Italian  journal  of  the  leftist
political  spectrum  MicroMega dedicated  a  whole  issue  to  the  thesis  that  contemporary
philosophy is above all else interested in religion and seeks to engage itself in a dialogue with
it. This thesis is then tackled by philosophers of various camps, but also by three theologians.
One of them is the archbishop of Chieti-Vasti, Bruno Forte, the second the founder of a new
monastery (Bose, Italy) Enzo Bianchi, and the third is no other than Cardinal Ratzinger. In the
preface,  he  is  introduced  by  the  journal’s  editor  as  the  quintessential  representative  of
Catholic  orthodoxy.  Ratzinger  was apparently amused by the  fact  that  his  text  would  be
included in a journal that usually accepts only articles by non-believers and that not long ago
had published a harsh critique of the Papal Encyclical on the relationship between reason and
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faith,  Ratio et  Fides, which is  thought to  be directly influenced by the Cardinal’s  views.
Ratzinger’s own interest in participating in the debate, however, is the prospect that religion
can be brought back to the focus of intellectual discussion and that a broad-based discourse
could be stimulated  on the truth  of  the Christian religion (per stimolare il  dibattito  sulla
veritate della religione cristiana). 
It is no coincidence then that ever since Ratzinger moved to Rome as head of the
Congregation  of  Faith  he  actively  sought  to  open  new  avenues  of  communication  with
intellectuals inside and outside the Church. His other important positions in the Vatican, as
long-time president of the International Theological Commission and as head of the Papal
Committee entrusted with the new edition of the  Catechism of the Catholic Church (1986-
1992),  provided  additional  incentives  for  taking  up  the  challenge  of  modernity  and  for
expounding  the  Christian  message  in  a  new  language  to  the  Catholic  faithful,  critical
theologians, and skeptical intellectuals. In an interview with a German journalist he revealed
that he had made it some kind of condition of accepting his appointment as prefect of the
Congregation of Faith and of giving up his beloved Munich archdiocese that the Pope would
allow him to continue his  scholarly work even in his  new position  and to publish as  an
ordinary theologian. As he confessed, he had secretly hoped that the Pope could not consent
to this condition. But to his surprise John Paul II. replied that although this request was rather
unusual there were precedents and he would have to consult his advisers. When the Pope’s
response came and was positive, Ratzinger had no longer an excuse to decline the Pope’s
request as he had done already once before when the Pope had asked him to come to Rome
not longer after he had been installed as archbishop of Munich. 
It  is  a  sign  of  Ratzinger’s  international  acclaim  as  theologian  that  in  1992  the
Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques at the Institut de France, the highest academic
institution in secular France besides the Académie Française, elected him as membre associé
étranger. The title of his acceptance speech is highly programmatic as it indicates Ratzinger’s
desire for dialogue that bridges the fortified borders between the religious and the secular
worlds: “The significance of religious and moral values in the pluralist society.”4 The list of
books and papers taking up similar issues and reaching far beyond the confines of Catholic
theology is long and includes  at least  the following:  “Liberty, Right, and the Good: Moral
principles in democratic societies”,  “Political visions and praxis of politics” (2002),  Truth,
Values, Power (1993). Faith, Truth, Tolerance: Christianity and World Religions (2004). The
small volume entitled: Values in Times of Change became an instant bestseller in Germany.5
3. The Lambertini-Voltaire Debate: A Remarkable Historic Precedent
Lastly, when Ratzinger was elected Pope and took the name Benedict XVI. an even
more  significant historic parallel became available that can shed new light on the Habermas-
Ratzinger debate. In choosing his papal name, Ratzinger wanted his pontificate to be seen in
line with his immediate predecessors of the same name and to carry their respective missions
forward. Benedict XV. (1854-1922) was the Pope during World War I who condemned the
use of poison gas as inhumane weapon and tried hard to mediate peace between the warring
parties. Although he failed, he steadfastly continued in his pacifist policy and soon after the
war had ended, which he had already at its beginning called “the suicide of Europe,” he wrote
an encyclical (Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum) pleading for international  reconciliation.
His moral standing is reflected in the inscription to a monument in his honor that was in 1920
erected in a church courtyard in the Turkish city of Istanbul. It reads:  “The great Pope of
world tragedy... the benefactor of all people, irrespective of nationality or religion.”
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The  intellectual  similarity  with  Benedict  XIV  (1675-1758),  the  former  Cardinal
Lambertini,  is  even more striking.  Prior to  his  elevation to  Pope he too was head of the
Congregation of Faith, then still called the Inquisition and had actively sought to establish a
dialogue with the intellectual representatives of the 18th century, the self-conscious age of
reason and enlightenment. As scholar, he was regarded as one of the most erudite men of his
time.  His  excellent  knowledge  of  literature  and  all  sciences  brought  him into  close  and
friendly contact with many famous authors, and in spite of some criticism he stated that his
familiarity with the likes of Tasso, Dante and Ariosto were a necessity for him as they gave
energy to his thought and life to his style. 
In the Enlightenment, belief was in rapid retreat and Cardinal Lambertini thought it
was not enough for the church to be merely defensive. As an observer summed up his motives
for dialogue,  “if the church was to deal with a world in which active Christians were in a
minority, it needed to convince others of the importance of what it was saying. It could no
longer  do  this  by  force,  but  needed  to  use  argument  and  rationality.”6 So  Lambertini
corresponded  with  Voltaire,  the  greatest  philosopher  of  the  French  Enlightenment,  and
maintained  this  dialogue  when  he  became  Pope. As  Voltaire  was  not  only the  greatest
philosopher of the French Enlightenment but also the feared critic of absolutism and advocate
of freedom of thought, particularly in matters of religion, Lambertini’s intellectual exchange
with him both as head of the Inquisition and later as Pope is all the more remarkable. Against
this  historical  backdrop,  Ratzinger’s  choice  of  the  papal  name  takes  on  a  new  and
programmatic significance.
II. The Context: Religion and Modernity 
In preparation of their  Munich debate,  it  had been agreed beforehand that  Habermas and
Ratzinger would reflect on the “pre-political moral foundations of the liberal state.”7 At issue
was the authority, scope, and possible limit of secular reason as it originated in ancient Greek
philosophy and established itself as the dominant force of modernity in the West during the
Enlightenment  period.  Its  particular  form of  rationality,  which  found  its  most  important
expression  in  modern  science  and  technology as  well  as  in  the  liberal,  democratic,  and
constitutional  state,  was  not  only credited  with  the  mind’s  liberation  from  self-wrought
bondage and Church tutelage, but  was  also thought to have no rival and thus to naturally
extend its reign to non-Western cultures and, finally, throughout the world. Thus the triumph
of science and technology was the triumph of secular reason. 
Due to the specific interests of the two discussants, this very large issue was narrowed
down to the question about the relationship between faith and reason in modern society and
the role of religion in the secular state. In its more specific form, the question had first been
raised  in  the  late  1960's  at  the  peak  of  the  neo-Marxist  excitement  in  Germany  by  a
conservative legal philosopher, Ernst Wilhelm Böckenförde, who later became an influential
judge on Germany’s highest constitutional court. For a moment it had looked as if the Marxist
utopian  vision  of  a  free  and equal  society exclusively based on rational  and  “scientific”
foundations had come a decisive step closer to realization. And in such a society there would
certainly be neither a need nor a place for religion, which would quickly disappear from the
secular scene and fade into oblivion. The opponents to views of such heroic simplicity fell on
hard times as their voices were drowned in the upheaval of streets protests,  “sit-ins,” and
“teach-ins” that  greatly  disrupted  university  life.  While  Habermas’ neo-Marxist  leanings
could easily be appropriated for the revolutionary cause, Ratzinger always steered clear of the
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theological sympathizers within the Church and in his own faculty at Tübingen. He became,
however, completely disillusioned when he saw himself as a target of anti-religious slogans.
He soon gave up his chair of dogmatics and went into some sort of internal emigration at the
largely undisturbed and more quiet university in the city of Regensburg. 
Böckenförde, however, didn’t mind a fight and caused a huge outcry with his claim
that in spite of appearances and neo-Marxist wishful thinking the roots of the modern, secular
state reached well below its supposed rational foundations. Instead it depended on spiritual
and moral resources it was unable to justify by its own means and within the perimeter of its
own rationality. One of those taking up this challenge was Jürgen Habermas. It is therefore
not without irony that after almost forty years he should again be confronted with the same
question  but  now  find  himself  in  some  sort  of  agreement  not  only  with  conservative
philosophers but even with the most prominent representative of Catholicism.
1. The Tale of Reason
The  Munich  debate  took  place  within  the  larger  historical  context  of  the  process  of
secularization  that  has  defined the state-Church relationship  of modern European society.
Although this is mainly a socio-cultural but also a political phenomenon of European history,
it generated a new, “liberated” form of rationality that found its clearest expression in modern
technology  and  instrumental  reason  and  as  such  has  long  extended  its  overwhelming
influence around the globe. Some of the cultural tensions the world is facing at present seem
to have one of their causes in the conflicting responses to the implications of secularization.
While  no  country  rejects  completely  modern  technology,  religious  (and  sometimes  also
cultural) resistance against the dominating power of secular rationality is on the rise. A brief
outline  of  the  process  of  secularization  that  is  the  point  of  departure  for  the  intellectual
exchange between Ratzinger and Habermas may therefore be necessary so as to bring their
debate into sharper profile.
The story goes somewhat like this: 
At the  beginning of  modernity,  the  grand medieval  synthesis  of  faith  and reason,
Church and state, collapsed under its own ideological weight and left in the ruins not only
three separate Christian churches fighting for the superiority of their respective truth-claims
but also invigorated reason that would soon leave churches and religion by the wayside. Kant
has famously illustrated this process in the image of the maid-servant and her mistress. In the
past, reason as maid-servant to faith had walked behind her mistress humbly carrying her
bridal gown. With the advent of modernity, however, she walked in front of her bearing the
torch by whose light alone faith (religion) could set her foot forward without stumbling. Yet
the story quickly took a new turn even Kant had not anticipated - or if he did, he kept quiet
about it. Before long the maid would run off altogether leaving her former mistress in pitch
darkness behind. After holding a grudge against her for a while and even turning hostile,
finally, reason would forget about her as if she had never existed. Then reason would bask in
her own light on the assumption that it would shine ever brighter and gradually enlighten the
whole world from West to East. 
In his best-selling book The Secular City (1965), Harvey Cox defined secularization
less  dramatically as  “the  liberation  of  man  from religious  and metaphysical  tutelage,  the
turning of his attention away from other worlds and toward this one.” Secularization then is
the process of socio-cultural change in which religion loses cognitive and social significance.
In its  extreme form of secularism the complete abolition of religion is advocated and the
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transfer of its functions to secular agencies.8
Typical of such functionalist theories of religion originating from the philosophies of
Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche is their attempt to reduce the basic religious experience to
something other than what religious people say it is referring to. Thus religion is no longer
supposed to relate man to God as in fact there are no such  “things” as transcendence, the
absolute,  or  God.  Consequently,  reference  to  anything  that  cannot  be  translated  into  the
language of secular rationality is illusory and the likely product of some complex mechanism
of  otherwise  ”natural” forces  that  sooner  or  later  will  find  their  rational  explanation.
Depending  on  the  theoretical  approach,  these  forces  have  variously  been  identified  as
economic, psychological, social, or cultural. They were thought to have disguised themselves
so cleverly that the naive mind could be misled to take them for something real beyond this
world, something that was religious in the full sense of the word.  
2. Religion Within the Bounds of Reason
In Habermas’ analysis, the greatest achievement of modernity is the liberal state of
equal citizens enjoying the same freedoms, in principle, under the constitutional protection of
secular law. This state is the historic result of the religious wars at the dawn of modernity and
of  the  collapse  of  the  authority of  comprehensive  doctrines  of  religious  or  metaphysical
provenance.  In the functional analysis of religion in his  Theory of Communicative Action,9
Habermas  had  argued  that  whereas  in  the  past  religion  had provided  legitimacy to  state
authority both in legal and moral terms, in modernity this function has been absorbed into
secular reason. Thus invalidated religious world views first gave way to metaphysical world
views which then evolved into rational discourses at various levels, above all scientific, legal,
and moral. The liberal state of equal citizens is based on religiously neutral ground and is
required to hold equal distance to churches and religious communities. The conduct of and
the participation in its affairs requires a commitment to exclusively public reasons open to all.
Secular morality is therefore expected to result from the rational consensus about principles
of universalistic ethics on the sole basis of the stronger arguments. It is the characteristic of
post-metaphysical thought that it has neither the authority of absolute truth previous religious
and metaphysical world-views had claimed nor the means to achieving it. Instead it proceeds
on  the  premise of  “methodological  atheism,” which  for  the  secular  state  translates  into
religious neutrality. By and large, Habermas continues to hold on to this narrative. Yet with
the  ever-accelerating progression of modernity, he seems ready to admit  that  the story of
modernity has  been written  in  too broad strokes  and that  the  time has  come for  a  more
detailed inspection and re-examination. 
With this assessment, Ratzinger can concur, albeit for rather different reasons. While
he would not accept the role religion has been assigned in the process of modernity, he agrees
with Habermas’ assessment that “the derailment of modernity” has become a real possibility
with frightening implications. If I am not mistaken he then goes even further by claiming that
it  is  not  only a real  possibility but  has  already  become manifest  reality.  On this  reading,
modernity is not simply in crisis, but has veered off its original track and begun to run wild.
Habermas,  however,  has  taken  refuge  in  the  belief  that  at  least  some  of  the  problems
modernity has  presented  us  with  are  merely indications  of  the  fact  that  it  has  not  fully
completed its task yet but remains an  “unfinished project.” While the project of modernity
certainly requires re-examination and adjustment, it has no viable alternative and still holds
the promise of being able to cope by secular means with the dark forces of its own making.
Though Habermas, on his  premise of methodological atheism, cannot enlist religion in the
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service of reason, the re-assessment of the historical genealogy of modernity as well as the
recognition  of  the  factual  re-emergence  of  religion  within  the  secularized  world  have
sharpened his intellectual sensitivity for religion and prompted him to redefine its role in the
liberal state as well as the state’s responsibility towards religion.
III. Shared Perspectives
For any discourse to be meaningful there needs to be some kind of common ground and a
minimum of shared convictions. In spite of all their differences, I see three major areas where
Habermas and Ratzinger found some kind of “overlapping consensus” in their debate about
the relationship between faith and reason.
1. The Challenge of Re-Emerging Religion
 
The first area of agreement relates to the fact that religion is still alive and well even in the
secular West. Not only does it pose a new challenge to the liberal state, it offers also valuable
resources  society can hardly ignore.  The recognition  of  the  factual  survival  and even re-
emergence of religion within secular modernity is taken at the theoretical level as a strong
argument  for  its  right  of existence.  Ratzinger’s  critical  question  whether  the  previously
advocated gradual abolition of religion was indeed a necessary condition of humankind’s
progress10 has found its answer. Not only has religion a right to exist in modernity but it even
has a positive role to play in it. 
Habermas  concurs and notes that it was the assumption of a common human reason
that  provides  the  epistemic  base  for  the  justification  of  a  secular  state,  which no longer
depends on religion. The surprising “political revitalization of religion at the heart of Western
society” requires a review of the epistemic relationship between secular reason and religion.
While  statistical  evidence  suggests  that  the  wave of  secularization  affected  all  European
countries since the end of World War II and brought forth social modernization, in the United
States  the  comparatively large  proportion  of  devout  and  politically  active  Christians  has
remained the same over the last sixty years.11
The re-emergence  of  religion  in  a  supposedly  secular  world  is  a  challenge  to
Habermas’ conception of modernity. It prompted him to reconsider  modernity’s, which he,
following Hegel,  had seen culminating in self-consciousness,  self-determination,  and self-
realization. Now, Habermas pays greater attention to the implications of the Judaeo-Christian
origin of those fundamental ideas for modernity. On Habermas’ interpretation, modernity is
the result of a process of secularization that liberated the cognitive core of those ideas from
Church domination and the political powers of religion.12 Self-consciousness is founded on
the  increasing  reflexivity that  absorbed the  substance  of  rigid  cultural  traditions  into  the
domain  of  reason.  Self-determination  is  the  result  of  egalitarian  and  individualist
universalism and its  vindication in law and morality.  Self-realization evolves through the
internal pressures arising from the demands on the individual to take charge of one’s  own
fate. 
In a recent interview Habermas summarized his re-interpretation of the driving forces
in  modernity:  “For  the  normative  self-understanding  of  modernity,  Christianity  has
functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst.  Universalistic egalitarianism, from
which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct
of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights, and democracy,
is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love.”
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In  other  words,  both  “Athens” and  “Jerusalem” have  played  important  roles  in
Western  thought  and  both  have  contributed  to  the  modern  emphasis  on  individualism,
freedom,  autonomy,  and  justice.  It  is  above  all  the  Christian  legacy  that  provided  the
ideological foundations for the human rights discourse. Yet, Christianity owes it to modernity
to take cultural diversity into serious account, and to apply these formal ideals worldwide
without coercion. 
Ratzinger,  by contrast,  can  take  a  more  relaxed  attitude  towards  the  genealogical
aspect of modernity as it  seems to confirm New Testament theology comparing Christian
ideas with the yeast that is gradually permeating and transforming the dough into nourishing
bread. On this reading, the effects of the Christian message are not restricted to the Church
but extend into secular society, which in turn cannot be fully understood without taking into
account its Christian heritage. However, the effects of Christianity, above all on morality and
the  human  rights  discourse, remain  necessarily  “anonymous” and  therefore  cannot  be  a
substitute for explicit faith within the ecclesial community of believers. 
The necessity  of  explicit  faith  and,  by  implication,  of continuous  evangelization
marked the line that already in the 1960s divided Ratzinger’s theology of salvation from Karl
Rahner’s theological  doctrine of  the anonymous  Christian.  While  Rahner  thought  a more
constructive  relationship  not  only  between  Christianity  and  modernity  but  also  between
Christianity and the other religions was possible and could be developed from the theology of
creation, Ratzinger, together with his theological friend  (and later cardinal), Hans Urs von
Balthasar, insisted on a clear separation between the Christian and all non-Christian (religious
and secular) realms. 
It is, however, remarkable that Ratzinger and Habermas concur in their views of the
potential  for  danger  inherent  in religion.  The  fact  of  the survival  of  religion  and  its
invigoration  in  modernity is  ambivalent  as  it  may unleash  highly destructive  forces  that
threaten civilized society and endanger humanity.  Both link contemporary examples of  the
destructive potential  of religion to fundamentalist movements  and their disregard of reason
that leads to an uncompromising rejection of the liberal pluralist state in favor of some form
of theocracy. These fundamentalist and reactionary movements threaten to replace the secular
world with a counter-modernity of their own making.
2. The Challenge of Instrumental Reason
 
A  second  area  of  consensus  between  Habermas  and  Ratzinger  can  be  found  in  their
acknowledgment of the tremendous risks mankind is facing at this historical juncture. Both
discussants see morally unrestricted “instrumental reason” as one of root-causes of the grave
uncertainties that cast long shadows on the achievements of modern science and technology.
While for Ratzinger those problems are symbolized in the destructive potential  of nuclear
weapons, Habermas, on various occasions, has expressed his concern with regard to social
and moral challenges arising from tensions between the progressive forces of modernity and
traditional  values.  One area where this  tension is  particularly evident  is  biotechnology. It
apparently were  -  as  we may recall  -  his recent  publications  on  this  subject  that  caught
Ratzinger’s attention. The new technologies in the life-sciences and their penetration into all
areas of human life have begun to change the parameters that previously defined the realm of
nature. They even extend their naturalistic and scientistic interpretations to the human person
and to  human  self-understanding.  In particular,  genetic  intervention  at  the  genomic  level
raises the fear that the resulting human product would have lost the fundamental  freedoms
constituent of  human personhood.13 Similarly,  Ratzinger  fears that  the human being is  in
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danger  of  being  turned  into  a  commodity,  which  would  have  lost  any sense  of  mystery
associated with creation. The temptation will arise to see in such product no more than raw
material for social construction that can be discarded if it loses its functional value.14
Doubts about the unchecked progress of modernity arise further from the scope and
pace of economic globalization and unfettered capitalism. In his acceptance of the prestigious
peace-prize of the German publishers association,  Habermas observed that  “the economic
language pervades everything and forces all  interpersonal relationships  into a pattern that
orientates  everything  exclusively  on  individual  preferences.  The  social  bond,  however,
consisting in reciprocal recognition of free individuals transcends the concepts of contract,
rational choice, and the maximization of usefulness.”15 In another context he notes that the
previous  balance  in  the  division  of  labor  between  the  integrative  mechanism  of  the
marketplace, bureaucracy, and societal solidarity no longer exists and that it has been replaced
by  an  economic  imperative  that  is  exclusively  focused  on  economic  success  of
disenfranchised, competing individuals.16 
Lastly, the far-reaching changes in society’s value structure and ethical outlook pose
the  risk  of  the total  collapse  of  moral  norms  and  an  increasing  erosion  of  moral
consciousness.  Indications  are  the  gradual  disappearance  of  “sensitivities  to  social
pathologies” and the growing inability to see any meaning in the question about the  “good
life”, or its opposite:  whether life can be wrong and meaningless (verfehltes Leben). It is
remarkable that Habermas should now pay specific attention to the substantive question of a
good  life  as  his  own  ethical  theory  had  avoided  it  and  instead  focused  on  procedural
mechanisms for the consensual recognition of formal moral principles.
As the changes evolved from within the parameters of secular reason, modernity is not
only under threat from outside, i.e. pre-modern religion, but also from inside. And it looks as
if it could soon be “derailed” by its own ever accelerating forces of progress and advancement
for the sake of advancement. Habermas is fully aware that no post-metaphysical philosophy
can adequately address  these  fundamental  concerns  and provide  the  answers.  Philosophy
within the confines of modernity has lost the ground upon which authoritative answers were
once constructed that were both authentic and consoling. In other words, philosophy is no
longer in command of reasons that once distinguished a holistic world-view that at the same
time could motivate right actions and meet the existential expectations of individuals for a
meaningful life within a meaningful universe. The Church-dominated world of faith, which
provided  normative  guidance  in  all  contexts  of  life  has  not  been  able  to  withstand  the
challenge of enlightened and critical reason and has collapsed into a plurality of competing
“comprehensive doctrines” and moralities. Yet secular reason emerging victoriously from the
ruins may now have arrived at its own limits or even at a dead end.
3. The Challenge of the Two Cultures
Habermas and Ratzinger agree, thirdly, in their evaluation that contemporary society holds
the chance of a new openness on both sides of the divide, secular and religious, for  a re-
assessment  of  the  cognitive  roles  of  the  fundamental  religious  conceptions  in  secular
discourse. Habermas’s re-examination of the genealogy of modernity has set a precedent for
the  positive  recognition  of  non-secular  moral  and  intellectual  resources  and  of  their  re-
integration  into  modern  society.  And Ratzinger  too  acknowledges  interculturality  as  an
indispensable dimension in any debate on the foundations of humanity.17 
The  Cardinal  concedes  that  the  search  for  true  humanity  cannot  be  undertaken
exclusively on the premises of Christianity, and this is a remarkable statement by the Roman
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official at the helm of Congregation of Faith. Yet he subsequently adds that they cannot be
undertaken exclusively on the premises of secular reason either. Christianity and the tradition
of secular reason represent  two distinct  cultures both of which have defined the Western
world - but mainly the Western world. In spite of their theoretical claim for universality, both
traditions  have  to  recognize  that  other  cultures  outside  their  perimeters  have  factually
remained  as  yet  unmoved  by  their  advances.  Ratzinger  refers  to  the  cultures  of  Islam,
Buddhism, and Hinduism as well as tribal cultures of Africa, which challenge not only the
revelatory claims of Christianity but also secular rationality in spite of experiencing within
their  own respective societies  similar  tensions  as  the culture of secular reason. With  this
interpretation of the tradition of secular reason in terms of culture, the Cardinal undercuts
Habermas’s universality claim for a common secular reason and reduces it to the claim of one
particular culture among others. Christianity’s new openness for secular reason is therefore
defined by a position of strength, not weakness. 
When both discussants advocate a new readiness to listen to each other in good faith
and to learn from each other’s thoughts and intuitions, they in fact advocate different things.
For  Habermas  it  means  that  secular  reason has  to  attempt  to  appropriate  pre-conditional
constituents of sound rationality that lie outside its purview. The universality claim of secular
reason is upheld as it recognizes no rival to its authority. Strictly speaking, the tradition of
secular reason is not simply one culture among others but rather provides all cultures their
rational  foundation.  Habermas  therefore had to  reject  the idea raised by a colleague at  a
meeting with philosophers in Teheran that secular rationality may represent nothing more
than one particular system or culture (Sonderweg) among other cultures or systems of truth.
While Habermas thus has to clearly separate the realms of faith and of reason, he accepts that
in today’s secular world of cultural  pluralism there is a greater need than in the past for
reflection  on  the  conditions  of  peaceful  cooperation  between  citizens  of  a  liberal
constitutional state.
Ratzinger,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  comfortable  with  the idea  of  comprehensive
pluralism  as for him the controversy among the various cultures, including the culture of
secular rationality,  about the respective claims for universality and truth has not yet been
settled. In his perspective of multi-culturalism, the tradition of secular reason represents only
one possible approach to truth within human history and this tradition is in need of correction
through religion. 
Ratzinger’s more relaxed attitude towards the divide between reason and faith is, of
course, grounded in a theology of Creation, which derives all good from God, and reason is
neither  an  exception  nor  a  natural  opponent  to  faith.  From such perspective,  the  liberal,
democratic state is not the antagonist to the Church earlier theology had suggested. Instead it
is  rather the neutral framework within which various  “comprehensive doctrines” can find
their places. Ratzinger therefore argues for a “necessary correlationality of reason and faith,
reason and religion so that they both are called to mutual purification and therapy.” Both are
in demand of each other and must  recognize each other in  their  respective roles.  This  is
particularly  necessary as  both,  religion  and  reason,  can  become  distorted  and  defective.
Ratzinger  recognizes  the  possibility  of  highly  dangerous  pathologies  of  religion,  which
currently unleash their disastrous potential in religiously inspired terrorism or more exactly in
terrorism  that  claims  for  itself  religious  roots  and  motivations  that  resonate  within  the
fundamentalist religious spectrum. 
The  Catholic  doctrine  of  reason  as  lumen  naturale provides  powerful  conceptual
means for ideological purification and therapy. For Ratzinger and in accordance with a long
tradition, reason serves in a dual-function as critical assessment of and as constructive advisor
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to religion, and both functions are grounded in the theology of Creation. Reason therefore is
not only the natural light that shines into human darkness so that even outside the realm of
revelation truth can be found. As Ratzinger points out, reason is above all “the divine light,”
which illuminates religion and which can and must be utilized within religion and for its own
purification. In as far as the natural light of reason is at the same time the divine light this
presupposes  a conception  that  correlates reason and nature in  and through their  common
origin in God’s Creation. This gives Ratzinger ground for his claim that in as far as faith and
reason are correlative and to the extent that reason itself can go astray it needs faith as its
limiting and corrective force. 
While  this  position  far  exceeds  what  Habermas  can  grant  from his  own agnostic
perspective and on the basis of secular modernity, he not only sees a positive role for religion
within modernity but also holds that the secular state needs religion. And that is something
really remarkable and merits further exploration. 
4. Peaceful Cooperation
Both discussants concur that any conflict between cultures must be resolved by means of the
better arguments and with respect for other conscientious convictions. On this latter point,
Habermas has more to say than the Cardinal. Although in the present context it is not possible
to provide his full and detailed argument, a few remarks may at least indicate the direction in
which his thought on this subject recently has evolved. 
Firstly,  Habermas  assumes  that  philosophical  reason  can  play  a  maieutic  role  in
mediating in the dispute between the conflicting comprehensive doctrines and holistic world-
views. He assigns to philosophy the role of interpreter of the substantive life-plans that unite
and separate the Christian faithful,  the believers in other religions,  and the non-believers.
Philosophy is thought to be able to assist in a discourse whose aim it is to find sufficient
commonalities for the establishment of a peaceful society on shared moral ground. While
philosophy may draw on its analytical abilities in the service of enlightened reason, it must
avoid any attitude of superiority and supposedly greater insight. 
Secondly, taking his point of departure in a critical review of Rawls’ concept of “the
duty of civility,” Habermas  holds that it would be neither fair nor necessary to demand of
politically engaged religious citizens to suppress their personal religious convictions in favor
of exclusively “secular reasons.” Such demand would ignore the integral role religion plays in
the life of persons of faith. It is therefore a matter of fairness that the liberal, democratic state
should not place a greater burden on the shoulders of religious citizens by demanding of them
to ignore their religious world views. It is therefore a matter of fairness that both sides ought
to be open-minded and sensitive to  other people’s world-views. Whereas religious citizens
may  make  public  contributions  in  their  own  religious  language  provided  that  they  are
presented so that secular citizens can grasp their meaning, secular citizens must  not close
their minds to the possible truth content of such presentations and even enter into dialogues
from which religious reasons then might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally
accessible arguments.18
I note in passing that this issue presents another context from which the question of
the  specific  status  of  secular  reason  could  arise  and  demand  further  scrutiny.  From
Ratzinger’s perspective one could argue that it was an illusion to simply regard secularization
as formal and procedural and in tune with culture-independent reason. If, however, secular
rationality too would have to be understood in cultural  terms,  the principle of procedural
neutrality would conflict with the de-facto privilege the secular position holds in the West. In
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other words, the question of the epistemic status of faith and reason remains unsettled. 
IV. Concordant Discord
In spite of fundamental differences, it is encouraging to see the two discussants engaged in
the honest search for common ground from which resources can be drawn in defense of a
shared conception of humanity and human dignity. While Habermas continues to hold on to
an agnostic position that respects the dividing line between faith and reason and steers clear
of any cognitive assessment of religious, or Christian truth-claims, he acknowledges that the
religious and in particular the Christian tradition offers highly important resources for secular
citizens  and  the  modern  world  in  general.  He  displays  great  sensitivity  for  fundamental
concepts in the Christian spiritual tradition whose recovery for secular modernity has become
a matter of urgency in the face of the continued erosion of its own moral resources. 
Habermas regards it as one of the major roles of philosophy in modernity to translate
religious  statements  into non-religious propositions,  i.e.  public  reasons that  carry relevant
validity claims without requiring a metaphysical foundation. While he has long committed
himself  to  this  sort  of translation,  he has  now become more  sensitive  to  the question of
whether such translation is indeed possible without remainder. Put positively, the question is
whether religion may have something substantial to say that must remain elusive for secular
modernity.
 Although Habermas resists post-modern temptations and does not waver in his belief
that modernity is the process of liberation from self-wrought immaturity and bondage and not
a disastrous development that should be undone, he recognizes that in this process something
important was lost and that it is one of the roles of philosophy to seek to salvage as much as
possible from the wreckage. The way to do this is to translate substantive religious concepts
into the parlance of secular reason. Habermas holds out the hope that in this way philosophy
can contribute to the re-integration of at least some of the religious resources into modern
consciousness, albeit  in the form of sensibilities, motives, and ideas that are accessible to
public reason. 
In this task he locates himself in the tradition of Hegel whose genealogical approach
sought to decode the highly suggestive narratives and enigmatic messages of the great world-
religions  so that  they could  be integrated into  the  universal  history of  the  mind  and the
phenomenology of  the  spirit.  Habermas  not  only believes  that  such  an  approach  is  still
possible today but also that it is highly necessary. He is convinced that the religious heritage
contains insights, intuitions, expressive possibilities, and forms of interpersonal behavior that
modernity could neglect only to its own disadvantage and which deserve to be reintroduced
into the communicative system of contemporary society. What is required is not so much the
whole-sale readmission of those religious insights into the system of communicative reason
but their transformation into publicly accessible concepts and motivations.  Examples of a
successful  transformation  Habermas  finds  in  secular  concepts  such  as  “positivity,”
“alienation,” and “reification” whose religious origins are associated with the narratives about
sin, the fall of humankind, and the loss of paradise as well as with the prohibition to form an
image of God (Bilderverbot). 
In the light of these secularized religious ideas the triumph of modernity under the
sign  of  capitalism  takes  on  a  new  look  as  it  is  illuminated  from  the  perspective  of  a
religiously motivated longing for meaning that transcends the economic sphere. The critical
application of such ideas has removed the veil of normality that had long covered the social
conditions of modern life: “Kant, Hegel, and Marx made secular consciousness feel the sting
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of  the  religious  heritage.”19 While  they  appropriated  religious  concepts  and  ideas  for
philosophy and utilized them for the progress and liberation of humankind, Kierkegaard took
the opposite position by criticizing secular reason from the perspective of faith and religious
reason. He confronted post-metaphysical thought with the unbridgeable heterogeneity of a
faith that rigorously denies the birthright of anthropocentric modernity. Thus he pointed to
something that from the perspective of secular reason must remain hidden and inaccessible.
Yet it preserves something that is of the highest importance to secular philosophy: the insight
in its own limitations. 
Habermas  compares  the  encounter  between  philosophy  and  religion,  between
knowledge  and  faith,  to the  aesthetic  experience,  which  is  similarly part  of  human  life,
although  it  is  inaccessible  to  any rationalistic  interpretation.  Philosophy  can  only  circle
around (umkreisen) the concept of the transcendent and point to the abyss out of which those
utopian energies emerge that motivate our longing for the realization of the “highest good” or
the “kingdom of God.” Philosophy, however, can successfully translate religious content into
its own language only as long as it is conscious of what it is doing: that it is and remains in
the service of reason and knowledge and is aware of the unbridgeable gulf that separates it
from revelation and faith. Habermas is convinced that any attempt to reduce the one to the
other or to blur the dividing line will inevitably lead to the collapse of both.  
But philosophy has a further and perhaps even more crucial role to play with regard to
religion and faith. Though it would be unreasonable to assume that the cognitive substance
and content  of  religion  has  been exhausted  and did  not  deserve to  be recovered through
secular  translation,  such  translation  is  possible  only to  a  point.  Habermas  is  aware  that
religious content may resist such translation and that not all of its substance can be recovered
in secular language. 
Instead of dismissing this remainder as insignificant, as some of his liberal colleagues would
advise, Habermas is remarkably sensitive to the semantic connotations of religious concepts
and to their significance for secular modernity. 
He acknowledges, for example, that when sin was transformed into guilt, something
was lost,  and this  has to  do with the longing for forgiveness that  is  accompanied by the
unsentimental wish that suffering caused to others may be made undone. This is different
from any form of secular remembrance of the victims  and even from Walter  Benjamin’s
belief in its therapeutic power since - in the words of Adorno - the slain are really slain, and
nothing can put past injustice right. Only religion holds out the hope that past suffering of the
just is not in vain and, as Kant acknowledged, that the worthiness of happiness arising from
moral action  may be rewarded with true happiness in a life to come. Thus the lost hope in
resurrection leaves a tangible emptiness in modern secularization when it is confronted with
the  irreversibility  of  past  suffering  and  with  the  injustice  of  abusing,  denigrating,  and
murdering  the  innocent.  The  magnitude  of  such  suffering  exceeds  any secular,  humanly
possible forms of restitution and compensation. 
While philosophy thus cannot be a substitute of religion and religious worldviews, it
has nevertheless a positive role to play. It needs to keep the empty space once occupied by
religion empty as a constant reminder of the loss incurred so that hope may still arise. In this
assessment  Habermas  comes  remarkably  close  to  the  iconoclastic  theology  of  the  Old
Testament, which anxiously sought to preserve  Yahweh’s place in the world by keeping it
empty. 
With this interpretation of the relationship between reason and faith the Cardinal can
fully agree. I conclude with two quotations from an article in which Ratzinger looks back on
one of his most important early books, Introduction to Christianity, and writes as follows:
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“Today, after the horrors of the [twentieth-century] totalitarian regimes, the problem
of  theodicy urgently and mightily demands  the attention  of  us  all;  this  is  just  one  more
indication of how little we are capable of defining God, much less fathoming him. After all,
God’s answer to Job explains nothing, but rather sets boundaries to our mania for judging
everything  and  being  able  to  say  the  final  word  on  a  subject,  and  reminds  us  of  our
limitations. It admonishes us to trust the mystery of God in its incomprehensibility.” 
And  further:  “The  mystical  dimension  of  the  concept  of  God,  which  the  Asian
religions bring with them as a challenge to us, must clearly be decisive for our thinking, too,
and for our
faith. God has become quite concrete in Christ, but in this way his mystery has also become
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